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ABSTRACT: The pandemic stressed the key role of  sustainable consumption and production 
patterns and highlighted the role of  local systems as key actors of  a recovery aiming at enhanced 
resilience to endogenous and exogenous shocks. Although the Recovery Plan marked a radical 
shift in the attitude of  the EU towards crisis management and allowed for an unprecedented joint 
financial effort, it might not be enough for tackling the challenges ahead. In this paper we suggest that 
two instruments should be further explored for this purpose: the Euratom Treaty and the European 
Stability Mechanism.
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1. Introduction
The pandemic changed in depth the perception of  the European public opinion 
about the counter-cyclical and growth-enhancing instruments available at the EU 
level. In a few months, we unexpectedly discovered that, notwithstanding still critical 
issues concerning an ineffective collective decision-making system, Europe was able 
to agree on a massive Recovery Plan, based on jointly issued obligations and own 
resources (still to be agreed upon).
While this was announced as a temporary and exceptional measure, the full 
recovery of  the European economy requires greater investment in industries and 
projects that allow for the full sustainability (in environmental, social, and financial 
terms) of  the EU’s future production and consumption patterns; and a robust 
increase in the resilience of  the European society to exogenous and endogenous 
shocks.
Building on two previous notes,1 we suggest that two instruments should be 
further explored for this purpose: the Euratom Treaty and the European Stability 
Mechanism (“ESM”). The former may seem to be a mere ghost of  the past, and some 
readers might be surprised to discover that it is still alive; the latter is a mechanism 
that reminds one of  a doom and undue intromission of  the troika into the domestic 
affairs of  Greece, imposing a strict austerity stance.
Nevertheless, they might prove to be particularly apt for the forthcoming needs 
of  the European economy, under at least two perspectives. The first is the urge to 
finance the Green Deal, as a major priority set by the European Commission for the 
long-term competitiveness and sustainability of  the European economy at the global 
level. The second is to guarantee funding for crucial local infrastructure.
The Euratom Treaty, after being “frozen” within the Lisbon Treaty, is a 
potentially powerful instrument only waiting for the political will to emerge for its 
implementation on a large scale. The ESM is in search for a new identity, after a 
phase as State rescue fund.
In order to explain our suggestion that is meant to complement the current 
financial effort of  the European Union and its instruments, we shall devote the first 
section to recall some crucial needs of  the European economy, as emerged before – 
and reinforced after – the pandemic; the second section is devoted to the role that 
might be played by the Euratom Treaty; the third to the ESM.
2. A bottom-up economy for the future 
Two aspects will probably stand out for their impact on the way the European 
economy and society shall adapt to the transformation required (and induced) by the 
recent global evolutions: climate change and the pandemic shock. 
The first concerns the need to provide more sustainable consumption and 
production patterns, thanks to: investments in climate-neutral technologies; a circular 
economy with integrated waste recycling mechanisms; and a transition towards clean 
and more efficient energies. These are the key features of  the Green Deal. In order 
to push on this, a massive commitment by both private actors and public authorities 
1 Alfonso Iozzo and Fabio Masini, “A Green Deal for European cities. Rethinking the role of  the 
European stability mechanism”, Centro Studi sul Federalismo Policy Paper, no. 45 (May 2020); Alfonso 
Iozzo and Antonio Padoa-Schioppa, “The Green Deal and Euratom”, Centro Studi sul Federalismo 
Comment, v. 167, no. 24 (February 2020).
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is required, providing an investment-friendly framework and resources that may 
trigger a long-lasting change.
The second concerns the need to rethink social, economic, political, and 
territorial planning in a way that allows a prompt, more efficient, decentralised 
– but also coordinated – response to exogenous shocks, that transcends current 
(State-centered) administrative and policy boundaries. This raises two related issues: 
the need to pay greater attention to the concept of  the “smallest surviving unit”, that 
might sit astride existing juridical administrations; and a reflection on what kind of  
infrastructure is required to make such units more resilient and reactive.
On this latter point, it is key to finance crucial local infrastructure that allow 
such local areas to effectively react to exogenous shocks and challenges; this implies 
competing on financial markets against the destabilising (but often high-yield) 
component of  market-induced instability due to short-termism (and the extremely 
variable demand for liquidity required to cover short-term obligations in times of  
crisis), redirecting resources towards long-term assets. As the public debate suggests 
both in the USA2 and the EU3, major cities are already pushing hard in this direction, 
calling for a reshaping of  the role, functions and competences of  local communities.
The concept of  “smallest surviving unit” as the minimum dimension of  communities 
allowing for the survival of  its members – once the “tribe”, later the “polis”, then the 
“nation-State”, and lately the “whole planet” – was profoundly shaken by the pandemic. 
In order to face a global problem, we re-discovered that the Nation-State is the only 
legal framework that can pass and enforce containment laws, and provide public 
goods that individuals require for their survival (latu sensu). 
At the same time, we discovered that all Nation-States, whatever their dimension, 
face similar domestic, sub-national issues concerning the optimum/most efficient 
degree of  decentralisation of  some crucial activities, such as sanitary measures, social 
control, provision of  assistance to those in need, etc. We also found that in the 
absence of  a coordinated supranational response to a supranational issue, the most 
likely outcome is an increasing gap between individuals, regions, States, continents; a 
potentially disrupting perspective for the future.
The globalisation and dematerialisation of  some economic activity in the last 
few decades have overshadowed the crucial role of  communities: in bridging market 
dynamics, and the role of  collective decision-making of  public authorities;4 and 
in their key role of  community control and absorption of  the negative effects of  
globalisation. This suggests that a truer – and constitutionally recognised – multi-
layered system of  (independent and coordinated) governments5 might be able to 
cope more efficiently with the multilayered nature of  the problems we face.6
As a consequence of  the current state-centered approach to public choice, 
two layers of  government remain underfinanced and underprovided for in terms 
2 World Urban Forum, “Making cities resilient 2030 (MCR 2030) – initial proposal”, UNDDR, 
2020, https://www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/home/article/making-cities-resilient-2030-
mcr2030-initial-proposal.
3 “Letter to the President of  the European Commission”, Matúš Vallo et al., February 11, 2020, 
https://budapest.hu/sites/english/Lapok/2020/eu-lobby.aspx.
4 Raghuram Rajan, The third pillar. How markets and the State leave the community behind (London: William 
Collins, 2019).
5 In the USA too, there is an increasing awareness on the need to return to a more decentralized, 
genuinely multilayered, federal structure of  the State.
6 Lionel Robbins, Economic planning and international order (London: Macmillan, 1937).
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of  (collective) public goods: the community level, and the supranational level. For 
this reason, we suggest that an existing supranational financial instrument like the 
ESM, suitably modified, might serve as a fund for supporting the lower, community-
level, long-term public investments (as argued also by Sassoli7), solving the twofold 
problem related to the under-provision of  both supranational and sub-national 
public goods.
This would allow both a joint, strategic view of  the required investment 
policies, accompanied by collective financing, monitoring and control; and a bottom-
up design of  community-specific infrastructure, that would ensure full democratic 
involvement8. 
The “smallest surviving units” can be defined (in the 2020 world) as local systems 
large enough to allow for the smooth functioning of  the underlying (internal) 
community9 and small enough to be identifiable from the rest of  the greater (external) 
community, proving an optimum balance between agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies. Each of  them can be visualised as the spider’s web system of  public 
goods and services (utilities, transports, social and cultural centers, etc.) needed for 
everyday life to be operational and resilient to shocks.10 
In many cases, these are metropolitan areas, or major coordinated local systems 
of  highly interconnected territories. Of  course, “surviving units” do not imply self-
sufficiency: we are living in a complex and intertwined world that cannot survive in 
the long term without major connecting infrastructure. But they are able, in cases of  
shorter-term perspectives driven by emergencies, to react efficiently to exogenous 
shocks, absorbing their negative impact.
When we speak of  community-based infrastructure, we do not just mean 
traditional infrastructure such as roads, bridges, airports; but broadband, energy 
production and distribution, waste recycling, innovative and flexible hospitalisation 
and health management systems, research laboratories and networks, interconnected 
logistics, social mobility, new ways to design the relationship between major cities and 
their territories, re-engineering the welfare state to cope with an ageing population, 
etc. Most of  this (material and immaterial) infrastructure requires enormous capital 
and a governing system involving the active participation of  a number of  private and 
public actors, on multiple levels. 
Financing both the Green Deal and local infrastructure on the Recovery Plan and 
Multiannual Financial Framework alone is insufficient, if  we are to acknowledge and 
agree on the amount of  resources expected by studies of  the European Commission 
and others. For this reason, we believe that the Euratom Treaty and a modified EMS 
should be carefully considered.
3. A new Euratom for the Green Deal
Environmental challenges require very demanding but certainly feasible 
economic and fiscal policy choices, if  (and only if) adopted within the Union 
7 David Sassoli, “Aiuti da Bruxelles arriveranno, il punto è che l’Italia sappia spenderli”, Interview 
by Paolo Valentino, Corriere della Sera, April 23, 2020, https://www.corriere.it/esteri/20_aprile_22/
coronavirus-sassoli-corriere-aiuti-bruxelles-arriveranno-punto-che-l-italia-sappia-spenderli-
280088a2-84c8-11ea-8d8e-1dff96ef3536.shtml.
8 Francesco Rossolillo, Città territorio istituzioni (Napoli: Guida, 1983), 47.
9 Adriano Olivetti, L’ordine politico delle comunità (Ivrea: Nuove Edizioni, 1945).
10 World Urban Forum, “Making cities resilient”.
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framework. With regard to climate risk, several lines of  action are being designed, 
also in relation to the commitment of  the Commission and the European Parliament.
The Commission has indicated the need to mobilise a volume of  resources in 
the order of  1.000 billion over ten years, a figure that could be achieved with a public 
contribution from the Union in the order of  100 billion euros per year, variously 
structured, which would act as a guarantee for a multiplier of  funding.11 Careful 
consideration has been given to the costs of  establishing a carbon tax,12 limited at the 
outset only to the borders outside Europe. 
The European Parliament has endorsed the objective of  the European Green 
Deal,13 which the new Commission under the leadership of  Ursula von der Leyen 
has placed at the heart of  its five-year program,14 with the activation of  a first 
Transition Fund (Just Transition Fund) of  100 billion euros , to which, as has been 
said, another 900 billion euros would be added in a decade from various channels 
in the Union budget. Calculations by the European Court of  Auditors and other 
authoritative experts15 nevertheless indicate a much higher figure, about 3 trillion 
euros in a decade, necessary to neutralise the climate risk by 2050.
Recent suggestions16 proposed the establishment of  a European Bank for 
Climate and Biodiversity (for a financial commitment of  100 billion euros each year 
for a decade) to support the ecological transition in Europe and Africa (considered 
as strategic to European interests). The Commission’s President suggested that the 
European Investment Bank (“EIB”) might be changed towards this purpose; and 
other observers and experts have proposed the creation of  a European Carbon 
Central Bank,17 as a pathway to tackle low political credibility of  the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme among investors.
In the last few months, though, the path emerged as more viable for this – 
compared to other alternatives constituted by a revision of  the Treaties and enhanced 
cooperation – is that of  a treaty outside the European Treaties, to be concluded 
between the countries available in the form of  an intergovernmental pact. 
Another approach that might be followed is anchored more directly to the Union’s 
institutional framework, assuming the use of  the existing Treaties, with the necessary 
involvement of  the European Parliament, the Commission and the two Councils. 
11 “Not all member states will benefit from the European Green Deal”, EurActiv, January 16, 2020, 
https://www.eceee.org/all-news/news/not-all-member-states-will-benefit-from-the-european-
green-deal/.
12 Alberto Majocchi, European budget and sustainable growth. The role of  a carbon tax (Torino: Centro Studi Sul 
Federalismo, 2018), http://www.csfederalismo.it/it/pubblicazioni/volumi/collana-federalism/1393-
european-budget-and-sustainable-growth.
13 European Parliament, Resolution of  15 January 2020 on the European Green Deal (2019/2956(RSP), 
P9_TA(2020)0005, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0005_EN.pdf.
14 Ursula von der Leyen, “A Union that strives for more. My agenda for Europe”, Political guidelines 
for the next European Commission 2019-2024, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf.
15 Roberto Palea, “Il valore strategico del Green Deal europeo”, Comment no. 164, January 8, 2020 
http://www.csfederalismo.it/it/pubblicazioni/commenti/1459-il-valore-strategico-del-green-deal-
europeo.
16 See the sites: “Climate-Finance Pact”, available at: https://www.federalists.eu/fileadmin/files_uef/
Events/2019/We_are_Europe_2019/Climate_Change-Finance_Pact.pdf  and “PETITION – Let’s 
stop Climate-killers from paralysing the European Commission”, available at: https://www.pacte-
climat.eu/en/.
17 “Why a European Carbon Central Bank”, MCC Press Release, Berlin, November 6, 2014, https://
www.stiftung-mercator.de/en/press-releases/nachricht/why-a-european-carbon-central-bank/.
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After the Treaty of  the Czech Republic (“European Coal and Steel Community”) 
was incorporated into the two Treaties on the European Union (“TEU”) and on the 
Functioning of  the European Union (“TFEU”) – updated after the approval of  the 
Lisbon Treaties – the structure for future EU energy and environment policies could 
be based on the Euratom Treaty (i.e. the “European Atomic Energy Community” – 
“CEEA”) in the consolidated version still in force. 
To this end, it would be necessary to extend the competences of  the TEU, 
TFEU and Euratom Treaties to other energy sources, the discipline of  which is now 
unachievable in the planning of  the Union’s future economic and environmental 
policies. The latter Treaty could be renamed the European Energy and Environment 
Community (“ECEA”).
One legal question that arises in this respect concerns the procedure that would 
be necessary to achieve this objective. Given that an amendment of  the Euratom 
Treaty would in any case be necessary to this end, the question is this: is it possible 
to use the procedure laid down in the second paragraph of  Article 48(3) of  the TEU, 
which allows the Treaties to be amended by a simple majority of  the Council and 
without the need to convene a Convention, subject to approval by the European 
Parliament? Or, alternatively, would it also be possible to use the procedure laid 
down in Article 48.6 of  the TEU, which governs the simplified procedure provided 
for in Part Three of  the TEU on the Union’s internal policies and actions?
The answer would seem clear, in the sense of  the admissibility of  the first 
procedure but not of  the second, since Article 106a of  the Euratom Treaty (2012) 
expressly provides for the possible application of  Article 48(2) to (5) of  the TEU, 
but not of  paragraph 6, which would seem to exclude the possibility of  using the 
simplified procedure.
The Euratom Treaty, in its consolidated version of  2012, also provides, in 
Article 206, for the adoption of  the procedure of  Article 48(2) to (5) for Agreements 
with one or more States or international organisations which require an amendment 
of  the Euratom Treaty in order to establish an association characterised by reciprocal 
rights and obligations.
The use of  the Euratom Treaty for EU policies on renewable energy and 
the environment would have the great advantage of  providing a ready-made legal 
framework fully consistent with the existing institutional structure. Very important 
would be the rules of  the Euratom Treaty on the establishment of  one or more 
Agencies empowered to pursue the relevant policies (Articles 52-56 of  the Euratom 
Treaty, 2012) as well as the rules on financial provisions in Articles 171-172, including 
the right to issue loans on the capital market. 
The latter element is of  great importance, as it would enable additional funding 
to be activated for the development of  new technologies, which require substantial 
resources that can only be partially activated with private capital. It has now been 
demonstrated that for investments in structures that take a long time and do not 
guarantee returns in the short term, only public resources can make up for it 
effectively: as the American model has also shown in the remote and recent past.
It should be added that, without prejudice to the need to supplement the 
European Union’s powers in the future by reforming the Treaties by granting 
autonomous fiscal power to the European Parliament in co-decision with the 
Council, the current legislation already allows the adoption of  provisions of  a fiscal 
nature, either through special or ordinary legislative procedures (Article 192.2 of  the 
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TFEU) or through enhanced cooperation or a specific intergovernmental agreement, 
as recently confirmed – as regards the latter two cases – by the European Court of  
Justice.18
4. Contextualizing the nature and scope of  the ESM 
The ESM was established in 2012 to tackle potentially destabilising financial 
imbalances in any of  the Euro-area members, more promptly and effectively than the 
European Financial Stability Facility (hence “EFSF”), by furnishing them with credit 
when market conditions unfavorable. The fund has an authorised capital of  704.8 
billion euros, of  which only 80 billion are actually paid-up, and has a lending capacity 
capped at 500 billion euros. 
As a joint enterprise of  the Euro-area Member States, loans from the ESM 
represent a joint obligation in case of  sovereign default. They are, therefore, a collective 
liability. Being a permanent financial institution under public international law that 
(after the IMF) can claim a preferred creditor status, the ESM can also (and usually 
does) issue bonds on the market that, being backed collectively, have a ‘triple A’ rating 
(Fitch). 
According to its extra-ordinary mission, to tackle cases of  severe financial 
distress, the ESM provides liquidity, conditional on a wide-ranging program of  debt 
restructuring and reduction. In fact, such strict conditionality proved socially and 
politically destabilising only in the Greek case (out of  five applying countries, the 
others – Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain – having used the ESM’s resources 
successfully, the last one to strengthen its banking system). In the Greek case, more 
than three hundred billion euros were provided (in three rounds of  negotiations, that 
started under the EFSF) to stabilise the macroeconomic figures of  a country that had 
experienced deficits of  up to 15% of  GDP for some years. Greece ended its ESM 
program after eight years (EFSF plus ESM), in August 2018.
Acknowledging the imminent need for the ESM to go beyond its original mission, 
in December 2017, the European Commission published a roadmap,19setting the target 
for the transformation of  the ESM into a proper European Monetary Fund (“EMF”).20 
This proposal had a threefold aim: a) to increase the accountability and legitimacy of  
its decision-making mechanism and procedures, bringing it within the scope of  the EU 
legal system; b) to facilitate the implementation of  the Four/Five Presidents’ Reports 
of  2012 and 2015 on the completion of  the economic and monetary union and; c) to 
anticipate the extension of  the Euro-area to the whole EU27. In the meantime, the 
European Council decided to use the ESM as a backstop for the Single Resolution 
Fund within the EU’s banking union, a reform currently under scrutiny by the Member 
States that should be adopted by the end of  2020.
These changes were all decided in the pre-Covid-19 era, and still aimed at better 
safeguarding the financial stability of  Euro-area Member States. The current, generalised 
and symmetric shock delivered by the coronavirus pandemic offers an opportunity to 
accelerate and widen the nature of  this transformation. The recent decision to allow 
access to the ESM to finance improvements to health systems is a step in this direction. 
18 Cases C-209/13 and C-370/12.
19 European Commission, Further steps towards completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union: a roadmap, COM(2017) 821 final, Brussels, December 06, 2017.
20 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of  the European 
Monetary Fund, COM(2017) 827 final, Brussels, December 06, 2017.
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We have already stressed that most services/infrastructure can be best organised, 
managed and monitored at the level of  major local areas: health-care systems and the 
welfare state, public transport, cultural socialisation, innovative solutions for an ageing 
population, energy production and distribution, etc. We suggest that such investments 
(by large municipalities or consortia of  local authorities) should be implemented through 
the emission of  Sustainable Bonds by the ESM. The ESM can be flexible and reactive; 
and it can be adjusted to serve the agenda set by the European Commission and its six 
priorities, therefore assuring strategic unity in providing funds for investments.
The ESM might therefore be transformed into a lending facility for the support 
of  long-term investments, following the model of  national financial institutions like 
Deposit and Loans Funds (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti in Italy, Caisse des dépôts et consignations 
in France, Crédit Communale de Belgique, etc), and thus act as the EU’s arm for executing 
public policy mandates. Sustainable Bonds should have a long maturity and might be 
purchased by the ECB (as is presently the case for most of  the ESM’s debt).
For this purpose, the ESM can (currently) count on a paid-up capital of  80 billion 
euros, with a lending capacity of  500 billion euros. This means that a leverage of  six 
can be seen as a reasonable proxy for its enhanced lending capacity. Given that the total 
authorised capital of  the ESM is 704.8 billion euros, once all this capital is paid (let’s 
imagine a schedule of  ten years to reach the target), the credit capacity of  the ESM 
might hit 4.000 billion euros. This might be a sufficient amount, around 3% of  the 
EU27 GDP (about 13.500 billion euros in 2018) for ten years.
The ESM should also operate as a re-insurer to the system of  national public 
investment banks (the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, etc) to finance smaller local initiatives, 
such as the modernisation of  local transport or building schools, hospitals, waste 
recycling facilities and the like in small cities.
The only conditionality required in this initiative should concern the use of  
resources to finance investments that prove to be sustainable in terms of: financial 
soundness (ability to generate cash-flows that guarantee the payment of  debt 
instalments), social cohesion, intergenerational opportunities, environmental 
protection, and technological and energy innovation. The eligibility criteria, selection 
and monitoring of  such initiatives should be set by the European Commission, acting 
according to the strategic plan for a Green Deal.
This specific role for the EMS, providing collective public goods at the subnational, 
community, level that is usually neglected, might also have a positive impact on 
European citizens’ perception of  the overall role of  European institutions. 
5. Concluding remarks
The pandemic-related emergency stressed the urge to create a more sustainable 
environment and the relevance of  local authorities in responding to social challenges 
and the provision of  essential public goods. A new, bottom-up, process of  local 
democracy should be built, constitutionally recognised, legitimised, and made 
enforceable; a process that allows for locally decentralised responses and strategic 
unity.
Such strategic unity, pending the implementation of  a more democratic 
collective decision-making process in Europe, can be provided by the six priorities 
set by the new European Commission for its mandate. In particular, the Green 
Deal: meant to remind us of  the New Deal launched by Roosevelt in the Thirties 
to restart the economy after the Great Depression, the Green Deal aims to foster 
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innovation, global competition, the transformation of  production and the building 
of  infrastructure that can cope with future sustainability challenges. 
From this point of  view, we suggest that two instruments should be further 
explored and exploited: the Euratom Treaty, which may represent an efficient 
mechanism for dealing with the macro-dynamics and projects concerning the Green 
Deal, and the ESM, transformed into a Sustainable Fund, helping finance long-term 
local investments in infrastructure with Sustainable Bonds. 
Recourse to these and other appropriate strategies requires, of  course, an 
impetus which can only come from politics at European level: hence the importance 
of  the process which started with the new European Parliament legislature, the 
new Commission, with the pandemic, and with the forthcoming Conference on the 
Future of  Europe, that might provide further bottom-up legitimation to this process.
